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CONSUMER PROTECTION AND HIGHER
EDUCATION-STUDENT SUITS AGAINST
SCHOOLS
A student undertakes a two-year course of study upon the con-
clusion of which, she is assured by the school faculty and administra-
tors, she will be qualified to teach mentally retarded children. Two
years later, upon successful completion of the course of study, the
student discovers she is not qualified for the job she just spent a great
deal of time and money training for. She sues the university to re-
cover her expenses and lost earnings.'
A student applies for acceptance to a university and, upon ad-
mission, is required to pay tuition for one term in advance. He pays
the deposit but decides to go elsewhere one day before th term begins
and is unable to recover any of the deposit. He sues the school to
recover his money.2
An admission brochure to a college advertises unbelievable rec-
reational and scenic attractions to enhance one's education. Upon
arrival at the school, the matriculant finds the cultural and geo-
graphic setting not so idyllic-the representations of the brochure
were indeed not to be believed! The school is prosecuted for criminal
misrepresentation.3
A student enrolled in a prestigious university takes a course
described in its catalogue as a prerequisite for further upper level
courses in the field. She takes the course and finds it does not meet
the catalogue description and realizes that she has not learned what
she felt she would from the course. She sues the school to recover for
her lost time and money.4
The above are but a few examples of the rapidly developing area
I This case is based on a suit filed against Ohio State University. Ojalvo v. Ohio State
Univ., No. 75-0602 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1976). (The case was transferred to the Ohio Court of Claims
and a settlembnt has been negotiated which will soon be entered on record in that court.) The
plaintiff took a two-year course in order to qualify herself to teach the mentally retarded only
to find out that more education is always required by the state for such a position.
2 This case is based on Drucker v. New York Univ., 57 Misc. 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S.2d 923
(N.Y. City Ct. 1968), rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T. 1969), affd without
opinion, 308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (App. Div. 1970). The student sued to recover such a deposit and
won in the trial court only to be reversed on appeal.
3 This case is based on State v. Jost, 127 Vt. 120, 241 A.2d 316 (1968). The supreme court
remanded for a new trial on the charge of false advertising by a school.
' This case is based on Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 499 (1972). The case is annotated in 51 A.L.R.3d 991 (1972). The plaintiff was an elderly
woman who sued the school when it cancelled a course in which she was enrolled in mid-term
due to a campus disruption in protest of the Vietnam War.
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of the law that is here labelled "consumer protection and higher
education." The movement is a part of the larger trend in the recent
past toward an increased consumer awareness and activism, and has
developed as a distinct entity in the law only within the last four
years. It is an area of the law that has few direct precedents, but it
may draw upon many analogous areas, as will surely be seen in the
near future. This Comment discusses the types of problems that are
found in this general subject and analyzes the legal theories that are
likely to be relied upon by potential litigants. Concluding remarks
will deal with appropriate solutions to the problems.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Labelling the problem at hand as one of "consumer protection"
is a gross oversimplification, for within the ambit of that phrase lurks
a number of smaller problems. They all have in common, however,
the element that the student-consumer6 is not getting what he was
promised or otherwise deserves to receive from a particular college
or university.7 It will be seen that many of the abuses listed below are
easily quantifiable, or at least as quantifiable as is normally the case
in civil litigation. But other abuses defy quantification or objective
evaluation and involve inherently subjective value judgments. The
literature on the topic is limited but suggests a number of the follow-
ing practices are widespread in educational institutions across the
country-'
5 See Address by Virginia Knauer to Second National Conference on Consumer Protec-
tion in Postsecondary Education, in Knoxville, Tennessee, November 1974, in EDUCATION
COMMISSION OF THE STATES, REPORT OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, Report No. 64, at 12-14 (1975).
In an article that parallels this one for the area of primary and secondary education, it is
stated that "[tihere is virtually no law in this area. The legal basis for this kind of action will
be constructed from general principles . . . and by analogy . Comment, Educational
Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 756 (1976).
For an extensive bibliography of the recently developed literature on this topic in general,
see Stark, The Many Faces of Consumerism, in PROMOTING CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR
STUDENTS 95-100 (J. Stark ed.) (New Directions for Higher Education No. 13, 1976).
1 The consumer of educational services is, of course, the student. This is not a startling
concept but has only lately emerged in the literature. See, e.g., Address by Sandra Willett to
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Colleges, January 1975, Presentation at
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Colleges (unpublished manuscript). See also
Stark, The Emerging Consumer Movement in Education, in PROMOTING CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION FOR STUDENTS I (J. Stark ed. 1976).
7 This paper will not deal with so-called "proprietary schools," operated for profit, which
tend to be vocational or technical in nature. Most of the arguments and discussion contained
herein, however, are at least analogous, if not directly applicable, to that situation; and some
of the citations given deal with proprietary schools, since more litigation has centered on them
in the past than on the more traditional schools. For a discussion of this issue in the primary
and secondary school context, see Comment, Educational Malpractice, supra note 5.
1 For lists of abuses, see Address by Sandra Willett, supra note 6; Toward a Federal
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-Due to the present trend of declining enrollments schools are
forced into keen competition for students? This has led to deceptive
advertising and other misrepresentations by schools and their admis-
sions staffs to lure students to the often hard-pressed school.
-The trend toward declining student enrollment has led to
overly aggressive recruiting of students by admissions and other
school personnel.'0 This entails an active role by school staff, beyond
mere written representations: enticing students with bloated claims
about the school, guaranteeing unavailable benefits, and unduly criti-
cizing the school's competition.
-Schools have begun to emphasize in extensive media advertis-
ing the climate of its geographic surroundings."'
-Schools have promised, explicitly or implicitly, job placement
for its students upon graduation, and then failed to provide the jobs
promised or any jobs at all.
-Schools demand and get tuition deposits to hold an accepted
student's place in his class and then refuse to return all or most of
the deposit if the student decides not to formally enroll.
-The student who has paid a full term's tuition drops out early
in the term, for good reasons or bad, yet is unable to get back more
than a small fraction of the tuition and fees already paid.
-Significant raises in tuition or fee charges after a student has
enrolled are effectively forced down a student's throat, since he is too
far along to change his plans.' 2
-Schools make a special effort to attract veterans, with their
GI Bill benefits backing them up, into programs not suited for the
individual involved.
-Schools encourage students to take out federally guaranteed
loans, which have an incredibly high rate of default.' 3 Defaults on
such loans are due in part to deadbeat students but also in part to
deceptive practices of schools."
-A student has progressed substantially toward his anticipated
Strategy for Protection of the Consumer in Education, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION,
THE FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION (1975), at I I; Stark, The Emerging
Consumer Movement in Education, supra note 6.
9 See Quest for Students Leads Many Colleges to Adopt Sales Techniques Once Shunned
on Campuses, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 13, 1974, at 1, 7-9.
10 Id.
Id.
2 See Medical Students Sue Their School, Hoping to Block Tuition Increase, CHRONICLE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION, September 2, 1975, at 11.
13 See Address by Sandra Willett, supra note 6, at 9.
" Id.; Thomas, The Effectiveness of the Guaranteed Student Loan Program as Applied
to the College Student Today (unpublished manuscript).
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degree when the school changes its degree requirements and even
imposes them retroactively upon currently enrolled students. 15
-A student completes all requirements that he was told were
necessary to attain a certain degree only to find out that he has not
met the actual requirements of the school.
-Schools have told their students that completion of a course
of study will qualify them for certain employment when in fact it will
not. 6
-Courses that are promised to be offered periodically are not
offered when promised, if at all. Professors who are supposed to teach
certain courses or at certain times never do so.
-Courses are abruptly cancelled in midterm. 7
-A school fails to give its students the type of intellectually
stimulating, quality education they desire. A professor, through inad-
vertence or intention, offers a course that could only be considered
of no value to the students."
II. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
In the limited number of suits that fit the category of "consumer
protection and higher education," a number of legal theories have
been advanced in an attempt to recover for alleged losses. Some are
more apposite than others, and some more successful than others, but
all are sought to be applied in a somewhat new context. The most
often attempted theory is one of contract law. Also tried are the tort
claims of negligence, misrepresentation or fraud, breach of statutory
duty, and the denial of a constitutional right."
A. Contract Theory
Contract law is the basis of the claim most often relied upon by
students suing their college or university .2 This theory posits an ex-
15 See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d
448 (5th Cir. 1976).
" See, e.g., Ojalvo v. Ohio State Univ., No. 75-0602 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1976); note I supra.
" See, e.g., Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d I, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1972).
Is See Students Filing Consumer Suits, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, November
24, 1975, at 1, 10. This article cites two pending cases in which students are alleging that their
courses were "worthless" and "pure junk." See also Suing for Not Learning, TIME, Mar. 3,
1975, at 73. This is essentially a complaint about the quality of one's educational experience,
and represents a very subjective and hard to measure damage to the student. This will probably
be the most difficult case for which to recover. See sections IT-IV infra.
, Defenses to these theories are discussed in section III infra.
See, e.g., Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1972); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928). Drucker v. New
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press or implied contract between the student and school. The consid-
eration from the student is the payment of tuition and fees and the
promise to abide by reasonable regulations; from the school comes
provision of academic and other services. The terms of the contract
are usually said to be found in the relevant provisions in school
catalogues, bulletins, and other printed material, representations of
school agents, and customs and traditions .2 To recover on this theory
the student alleges a breach of contract by the school that harms him.
The nature of the breach can run the gamut of the abuses suggested
earlier, as almost all elements of the student-school relationship are
arguably covered by the terms of this partially written contract whose
terms are pieced together by collecting various written and oral repre-
sentations of the school.
On the basis of prior holdings, courts are almost certain to ac-
cept the contract analysis as at least one of the analytical frameworks
within which it will operate in student-school litigation. Cases can be
found well back into the nineteenth century whose holdings in this
context are based on contract law,22 though they have not been con-
sumer oriented suits. Courts have not always been enthusiastic about
using contract law, because it is not on all fours with the student-
school relationship, 23 but nevertheless it remains the most enduring
York Univ., 57 Misc. 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. City Ct. 1968), rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 789,
300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T. 1969), affd without opinion, 308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (App. Div. 1970);
Stad v. Grace Downs Model and Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1971); Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (1901); Southern
Methodist Univ. v. Evans, 131 Tex. 333, 115 S.W.2d 622 (1938); Note, Contract Law and the
Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Contract Law];
Note, The Student-School Relationship: Toward A Unitary Theory, 5 SUFF. L. REv. 468
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Unitary Theory]. All of these and many others identify the student-
school relationship as one of contract in post-secondary education.
21 See, e.g., Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1972); Drucker v. New York Univ., 57 Misc. 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. City Ct. 1968),
rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T. 1969), affd without opinion, 308 N.Y.S.2d
644 (App. Div. 1970); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967); Note,
Contract Law, supra note 20, at 258. Customs and traditions could work in favor of either the
student or school, as could the other terms of the contract, and would include such things as
"one hour credit" representing one hour per week and not one hour per term, as the phrase
might literally be read, a class "hour" being only fifty minutes or forty-eight minutes, a class
having a certain emphasis over past years, and other concepts that are nowhere spelled out
explicitly but are "understood" by most people associated with post-secondary education or
by most people at an individual school.
2 See, e.g., State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278 (1882). Cf Note, Contract Law,
supra note 20.
23 Note, Unitary Theory, supra note 20, at 474-79 discusses the student-school contract
and concludes that, while it is the most popular theory used in this context, it is not entirely
appropriate. Instead, a "unitary theory" is found to be a better means of analysis. See also K.
ALEXANDER & E. SOLOMON, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 413 (1972), where it is said that
the contract theory is particularly uncomfortable in the public school context since these schools
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and pervasive legal theory used in this area.U
Assuming that a court accepts breach of contract as the proper
claim for a student to advance, recovery by the student is still not
assured. What the precise terms of any contract are can be quite
troublesome. Initially the court must determine the breadth of the
contract-does it cover only items explicitly mentioned in the
school's written and oral representations, or will a large number of
implied terms be added by custom and tradition or other reasonable
expectations? The more concrete, quantifiable aspects of the student-
school relationship fit contract analysis very well and would likely be
included in any contract found to exist. These include tuition and fee
charges, specific course offerings, requirements to be met to obtain
a degree, and any disciplinary regulations the school may have pub-
lished.21 But some rather amorphous items that do not fit contract
analysis as well are less likely to be included in any contract. These
include the quality of educational experience promised or at least
expected in the absence of a promise, the value of a particular course,
and aesthetic considerations.26 In the final analysis a court may sim-
ply be faced with a common-sense decision as to precisely what falls
within the ambit of any contract between a student and his school.
Parties could argue for broad and narrow interpretations and both
be on solid legal foundations.
While written statements in materials such as school catalogues
will constitute most of the terms of any contract, simply because they
will be the easiest to show, oral representations of school agents can
also become an element of the contractY A problem arises when
written and oral terms conflict and a student relies on the oral state-
ments of a faculty member or administrator only to discover he has
not complied with the school's written policies. If the student's reli-
ance was justifiable the school should be estopped to deny the student
the right to continue to rely on the oral representations made to him,
generally must accept all applicants and the contract element of freely entering into a bargain
is thus lacking.
2 See Note, Contract Law, supra note 20. See also, Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc. 2d
651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Note, Judicial Review of the University-Student
Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 95 (1973).
2" Disciplinary regulations are a part of any contract and abiding by them represents one
basic element of what the student promises to do as his part of the contract. See notes 20 & 21
supra.
2" See note 18 supra. Some courts have also held that the contract includes an understand-
ing that the school has nearly total discretion to change at least the academic requirements,
even after a student is nearly finished with a particular course of study. See Mahavongsanan
v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
2' See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 608 (1976)
and some courts have so held.2s Such holdings are based upon the
notion that a principal is to be bound by the representations of its
agent.2 9
Even if it has been determined that a student-school contract
exists and that its terms encompass the conduct in question, recovery
is still not certain. It must first be determined that there was a breach
of the relevant portion of the contract. Unlike more sophisticated
documents, this contract does not spell out what constitutes a breach,
principally because the contract analysis is superimposed upon a rela-
tionship probably not initially conceived by the parties as being con-
tractual in nature. The doctrine of substantial performance would
probably apply to this contract, so that the school would only need
to substantially perform to be able to demand that the student per-
form his part of the bargain (usually a promise to pay money)." But
substantial performance is not a complete discharge of duty for the
school; it merely triggers the student's duty to perform and indicates
that any harm done to the student will be relatively small.3 If the
breach is de minimis the student will be denied recovery altogether,
and the student would be unlikely to bring a suit for such a breach
in the first place. Much depends on the nature of the breach charged
by the student. If it involves an abuse that is readily quantified, then
delineating the terms of the contract, and thus its breach, will be
relatively easy. But as one deals with less measurable problems it is
very hard to determine if a breach has occurred because of the subjec-
tive element necessarily involved. Courts may well be hesitant to
substitute their subjective value judgments for those of educators who
supposedly have an expertise in these areas. 3
2 Healy v. Larson, 67 Misc. 2d 374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1971), affd, 42 App.
Div. 2d 1051, 348 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1973), affd without opinion, 35 N.Y.2d 653, 360 N.Y.S.2d
419 (1974); Blank v. Board of Educ., 51 Misc. 2d 724, 273 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Both
of these cases estopped a school from denying a plaintiff his degree when he complied with the
requirements outlined to him by administrators and faculty, which turned out to be inconsistent
with general university policy. This rationale is cryptically questioned in Wong v. Regents of
University of Calif., 15 Cal. App. 3d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1971).
2' See generally W. SEAVeY, AGENCY §§ 55 & 57 (1964).
10 See 3A A. CORBIN CONTRACTS, §§ 700-12 (1960).
3' Id. § 702.
'2 Students Filing Consumer Suits, supra note 18, reports that the case suggested in the
text at note 12, supra, was dismissed as a contract action, even though an $1800 tuition increase
came after catalogue statements that only $200 increases were to be expected. The article
suggests that vague catalogue language was at least in part responsible for how the case was
resolved.
3 Id. The author suggests that the reluctance of courts to substitute their judgment for
that of academicians as a reason for the lack of success of most educational consumer suits.
On the difficulty of courts in evaluating academic performance, see Wright, The Constitution
on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1070 (1969). See note 100 infra.
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If the student does establish a breach of contract, the amount
of damages suffered will often be speculative or at least very hard to
show. Again it is unwise to generalize for there are some areas that
lend themselves relatively easily 3 to damage calculation, such as
cancellation of a course in mid-term, repudiation of a room or board
contract, or failure to provide a special service or activity paid for
separately. But other types of damages defy valuation in normal
terms. It will not be easy to calculate the harm in failing to learn
enough about a given subject, especially if the subject is not related
to the student's chosen future vocation. It is simply hard to value in
money terms the benefits of being a well-educated person. 5 Of
course, it is also hard to value a human life or periods of pain and
suffering, yet courts have had only minimal qualms about doing so.
But in those cases courts tend to feel compelled to allow some award
because it is so clear that the plaintiff has been seriously harmed.
That serious a harm would be rare in the context of consumer protec-
tion and higher education. Thus in many cases damages will simply
be considered so speculative that a total denial of recovery will re-
suit.",
At least one student has tried to recover on a third-party benefi-
ciary contract claim.37 This claim stated that the student was a bene-
ficiary of the contract between the university and a professor and thus
was able to recover for the failure of the professor to teach in accord
with his contract. The court held this was not a claim upon which
I1 The phrase "relatively easy" is deliberately chosen. Damage calculations are probably
only occasionally "easy" to determine.
I' For a case in which the plaintiff sought restitution of tuition and recovery of expenses
for books and the like, see Students Filing Consumer Suits, supra note 18. See also Trustees
of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574, 148 A.2d 63 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed.
31 N.J. 211, 156 A.2d 251 (1959). In this case, the defendant-student alleged in a counterclaim
that Columbia
had represented that it would teach defendant wisdom, truth, character, enlighten-
ment, understanding, justice, liberty, honesty, courage, beauty, and similar virtues
and qualities; that it would develop the whole man, maturity, well-roundedness,
objective thinking and the like; and that because it had failed to do so it was guilty
of misrepresentation, to defendant's pecuniary damage.
53 N.J. Super. at 576, 148 A.2d at 64. The counterclaim also quoted from "college catalogues
and brochures, inscriptions over University buildings and addresses from University officers."
Id. at 577, 148 A.2d at 64-65. Summary judgment was granted for Columbia on this counter-
claim, but the allegations well illustrate how subjective some elements of an education are and
how hard they would be to value. Cf Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ga.
1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the district court awarded one dollar in
damages, accompanying an order compelling the school to grant the plaintiff a diploma.
1 "In order to be entitled to [recovery] the plaintiff must lay a basis for a reasonable
estimate of the extent of his harm, measured in money." 5 A. CORBN, supra note 30, § 1020.
1 Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d I, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1972).
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 608 (1976)
relief could be granted but gave no reasons for doing so.38 This is
the proper result, since a student is only an incidental beneficiary of
such a contract and, as such, not able to recover on that basis. 9
The statute of frauds should present no bar to recovery. 0 There
is a new contract every academic term, so no contract to be per-
formed over a year from its formation is involved. Since there is no
sale of goods, it is of no import that the contract consideration may
be greater than the statutory cutoff point (usually $500)." These are
the only portions of the statute that could arguably apply to this
contract. Even if the statute of frauds did apply, one could in most
cases piece together enough writings to satisfy the statute's require-
ment of a writing, for the statute does not require an integrated
contract. The writing would have to be signed by the party to be
charged-the school-but the school's name on the documents4 2 or
signatures of its agents43 should suffice.
One contract doctrine working in favor of the student-plaintiff
is that of contracts of adhesion.44 This doctrine cuts against the gen-
eral rule of freedom of contract and allows a court to refuse to
enforce contracts that are excessively one-sided. "Standardized con-
tracts .. .drafted by powerful commercial units and put before
individuals on the 'accept this or get nothing' basis are carefully
scrutinized by the courts for the purpose of avoiding enforcement of
'unconscionable' clauses. '45 Since the terms of a contract are found
largely in school-authored documents and the student has almost no
bargaining power, the contract of adhesion approach is quite appro-
priate in this context. While the doctrine is most often applied when
there is a near monopoly on a supply of goods or services," it has
also been applied when there is what could be called a "de facto
monopoly"-a large number of suppliers offering the same harsh
31 Id. at II, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
" To recover as a third-party beneficiary of a contract between two other parties, the
parties to the contract must have "intended" to benefit the third-party and not merely have
"incidentally" benefitted that person. See 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 30, §§ 776, 779C;
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 147 (1932).
11 On the statute of frauds generally, see 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 30, §§ 275-531; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 1335 (Page 1975).
*t UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201.
4 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 30, § 520 (though there might have to be an intention to adopt
this as a signature).
Id. § 525.
" Note, Contract Law, supra note 20, at 265-66; Note, Unitary Theory, supra note 20, at
479.
' 6A A. CORIN, supra note 30, § 1376.
See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
applying the doctrine to automobile manufacturers, from which there are only a handful to
choose.
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terms," giving the consumer no meaningful choice. That the con-
sumer of education has no meaningful choice on some terms of the
educational contract, such as tuition and fee refunds, goes without
saying. This is not to say that the entire contract is unconscionable
per se, for that would preclude the existence of any contract in which
one party is a large commercial, or educational entity; 8 rather it is
to say that a contract between parties of grossly disparate bargaining
power should be closely scrutinized for any unconscionable terms.
Only the unconscionable terms need be invalidated, for a court can
refuse to enforce one term of a contract without declaring the entire
contract void 49-and surely not all aspects of the student-school con-
tract are harsh and oppressive.
Thus, by using the contract of adhesion approach, a student
should be able to avoid particularly harsh aspects of the student-
school contractual relationship. The most likely recovery under this
approach would be for niggardly refund policies closely resembling
penalties, which are generally disallowed in contract law.5" A student
would thus be able to recover his entire deposit less actual damages
incurred by the school," instead of the arbitrary or nonexistent recov-
ery now available, which is largely unrelated to the actual harm
suffered by the school.12 Other areas of abuse also lend themselves
11 The typical situation envisioned here is a contract with insurance companies; there are
many to choose from but no real choice exists since they all offer essentially the same, some-
times harsh terms. See 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 30, § 1376.
11 For a discussion of whether schools today are commercial entities as much as educa-
tional institutions, see note 91 infra and accompanying text.
C Of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
o See, e.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947). See also 5 A. CORBIN,
supra note 30, § 1057. While it could be argued that the sum retained represents liquidated
damages, as such it would have to be a "genuine pre-estimate" of damages. Id. § 1059. If it is
a "genuine pre-estimate" of damages, then the school may keep the sum; if not, which is the
assumption here, then the liquidated damages provison is a nullity. Id.
"' This assumes the school's costs are indeed less than the deposited amount. This may
not be the case and would be a question of fact to be resolved at trial, but would make no
difference as to the principle involved. If student demands for acceptance far exceeded available
positions and schools could accept applicants only as first-year students, as in many profes-
sional schools today, the school could argue that its damages were actually much greater than
the deposit; for if the student drops out after a certain point it may be too late to ever fill his
position, because students must all begin at the same time. Thus the school would lose the
expected tuition payments over the balance of what would have been the student's academic
career there.
S2 This general theory was accepted by one court, though reversed on appeal. Drucker v.
New York Univ., 57 Misc. 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. City Ct. 1968), rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d
789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T. 1969), affd without opinion, 308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (App. Div.
1970). The reversal relied on the concept that the student could not recover because he had
committed a breach of contract and one who does so may not be heard to seek recovery of his
losses. This is an outdated idea and has been rejected by some courts that have held a defaulting
party may recover on a contract, at least to the extent of preventing unjust enrichment on the
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to this general analysis, such as extreme raises in tuition or fee
charges, or excessively demanding conditions for student aid. But
many of the problems cannot be properly handled in the contract
framework and are better attacked elsewhere. Finally, it should be
noted that determining whether a contract term is unconscionable is
essentially a subjective judgment on the part of the court. Since it
involves a myriad of social and even political factors, a sound predic-
tion of success on the claim is impossible. And it would not be wholly
irrational to hold that some school policies that seem particularly
onerous to the student are actually necessary for the smooth adminis-
tration of higher education.
B. Negligence Theory
A second legal theory often relied upon by students seeking
redress from educational institutions is found in the tort doctrine of
negligence. 53 This claim asserts that from the special relationship
between student and school a duty arises on the part of the latter to
adequately provide those services usually associated with such institu-
tions;54 and that the school, through its agents, has been negligent in
failing to act reasonably in accord with that duty and has thus
wronged the student. 5 This approach could encompass almost all of
the earlier mentioned abuses and would include the failure to provide
academic and physical services of adequate quality, failure of an
administrator to properly supervise faculty below him, failure to dis-
close information to students, and failure to schedule promised
courses.
part of the other party. See Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951), and
cases cited therein. The plaintiff in Dubrow v. Briansky Saratoga Ballet Center, Inc., 68 Misc.
2d 530, 327 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. City Ct. 1971), got back a tuition payment, but on the grounds
that her withdrawal due to illness meant that the implied condition of the contract that she
would be able to attend the school had not been met, even though her contract with the school
said withdrawal for any reason meant forfeiture of all tuition. The court distinguished Drucker,
saying her illness excused the plaintiff in this case.
I See Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif. 25 Cal. App. 3d I, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1972);
S. SANDOW, EMERGING EDUCATIONAL POLICY ISSUES IN LAW: FRAUD (1970), (containing a
survey conducted at Syracuse University's Educational Policy Research Center); Suing the
Schools for Fraud: Issues and Legal Strategies, Transcript of a Conference on Fraud in the
Schools held in Washington, D. C., March 1973. The latter two sources deal largely with
secondary education, but the legal theories discussed should also be applicable to post-
secondary education. This Comment will deal with negligence in the consumer protection
context and not garden-variety negligence actions that students and others often bring against
schools, such as personal injury cases.
" One could talk in terms of the "reasonable school," to analogize to the "reasonable
man," but it is hard to conceptualize a school being reasonable or unreasonable apart from
the actions of its agents.
11 This assumes the necessary causation, which is a question beyond the scope of this
Comment.
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Prior court holdings indicate that a recovery sought in tort based
upon negligence is less likely than recovery in contract. But this is not
an inconceivable or improper application of the law of negligence,
given the proper factual setting.56 The student would first have to
establish that the school was under a duty to prevent him from being
exposed to unreasonable risks. 57 No cases have been found on point
in the consumer protection area, but no good reasons appear for
holding there is not such a duty. Duty is "only an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."5 No widely
accepted test for whether a duty exists has ever been developed,59 but
since it turns largely on a judgment as to whether the plaintiff de-
serves legal protection, it is quite plausible that the student-school
relationship would give rise to such a duty in this context, especially
if the court feels a genuine problem exists and no other means have
succeeded in remedying it. Next, the student would have to show that
the school failed to conform to the standard required, which would
presumably be that conduct done by other "reasonable" schools in
similar circumstances. 0 The student would have to put forth proof
to the effect that the school, through its agents, acted unreasonably
and as a result caused an undue risk of harm. This question has to
be resolved in all negligence cases, and no doctrinal difficulties appear
with resolving it in this context. Finally the student would have to
show an injury suffered as a result of the above misconduct, and that
it was proximately caused by the acts of the school."1 Again these are
matters of proof that have to be analyzed in every case, and since such
charges could run the entire gamut of the student-school relationship,
no generalization can be made about the success of a negligence
claim.
The major difficulty with predicting the success of a negligence
suit by a student in the consumer role is the fact that this is a rela-
tively novel application of negligence law. Negligence covers an un-
limited scope of human conduct, however, and it has been
demonstrated that nothing inherent in negligence doctrine precludes
The plaintiff in Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 2d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr.
499 (1972), alleged negligence, inter alia, on the part of the defendants in cancelling a class in
mid-term. The court did not explicitly discuss negligence, basing its holding on contract
grounds, but it did not rule out negligence in overruling defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
' See W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 20, 53 (1971).
Id. § 53.
I' d.
Id. §§ 30-33.
" Id. § 30.
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its application here. Many situations can be hypothesized in which
negligence would be appropriate: sudden tuition raises caused by
negligent bookkeeping; promised courses not offered due to negligent
planning by a curriculum committee; inflated promises made by ad-
missions personnel due to negligent supervision by their superiors.
This list could continue to great length but is sufficient to show that
negligence should be a viable claim for a student's lawsuit in the
setting of consumer protection and higher education.12
C. Fraud or Misrepresentation Theory
A tort claim more concrete than negligence is one based on
misrepresentation or fraud . 3 Such complaints arise largely due to
false advertising designed to lure students to a campus, and false
claims about the results supposedly flowing from enrollment in cer-
tain academic programs. Misrepresentation has an element of inten-
tion in it not usually found in negligence, but on the proper facts it
should be a viable cause of action for an injured student, albeit a
harder one to show. Similarly, the criminal laws could come into play
here since most jurisdictions have some sort of criminal fraud statute.
These statutes contain the same basic elements as would a civil charge
of misrepresentation,65 although there would be the extra burden of
82 One problem that will arise in some cases is that negligence is usually thought to be an
unintentional tort, while much of the behavior complained of will be intentional or knowing.
If negligence is regarded as dealing solely with unintentional acts then it would not apply in
such circumstances, but if negligence is seen as a failure to meet a certain standard of care then
no problem is presented by the acts being intentional. The latter view would seem more
satisfactory, for otherwise a school could defend a negligence action on the grounds that it knew
what it was doing, as long as the behavior came within no other prohibited area. Negligence is
often defined in terms of what a tortfeasor "knows or should have known," indicating one may
be deemed negligent by the usual objective test or by a subjective test of actual knowledge of
creation of an unreasonable risk. See, e.g., Wire v. Williams, 270 Minn. 390, 133 N.W.2d 840
(1965); LaMarra v. Adams, 164 Pa. Super. 268, 63 A.2d 497 (1949). This is analogous to the
criminal law case in which "negligence" is the culpable state of mind required to convict, yet a
higher culpable state of mind (e.g., "knowingly") will also meet that standard. See. e.g., OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(E) (Page 1975).
11 See, e.g., Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d I, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1972); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 574, 148 A.2d 63 (App. Div.),
appeal dismissed, 31 N.J. 221, 156 A.2d 251 (1959); Ojalvo v. Ohio State Univ., No. 75-0602
(Ohio Ct. Cl. 1976); Behrend v. Ohio, No. 75-9401 (Ohio Ct. Cl., filed June 27, 1975); Southern
Methodist Univ. v. Evans, 131 Tex. 333, 115 S.W.2d 622 (1938); State v. Jost, 127 Vt. 120,
241 A.2d 316 (1968). Cf Stad v. Grace Downs Model and Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d
1095, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. City Ct. 1971).
11 But cf note 61 supra.
9' See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2913 (Page 1975), particularly § 2913.02 ("Theft")
which proscribes a purposeful deprivation of property or services, inter alia, by deception. This
section is very broad and certainly could be read to include the taking of tuition under the guise
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proving the existence of the required culpable state of mind and all
other facts beyond a reasonable doubt instead of merely by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
In order to recover in a civil action the student would have to
establish all of the elements traditionally required for a misrepresen-
tation claim.6 First, the student would have to show that the school
did indeed make a false statement and that it was a material false
statement of fact and not of opinion, which might not be easy since
many statements about the quality of an enterprise will more likely
be opinion. Second, the student would have to establish scienter by
showing a knowledge that the statement was false or at least that
there was not a sufficient basis of information upon which to make
it. Similarly the student would have to show an intent, on the part of
the school through its agents, to induce this student into relying on
the misstatement. These last two elements would probably be ex-
tremely hard to show, though circumstantial evidence could likely be
adduced in a given case. Next the student would have to show jus-
tifiable reliance upon the misstatement, and, finally, that his reliance
resulted in damage to him. Although the law of misrepresentation
suggests nothing that would prohibit this application,67 it would seem
unlikely that a fact pattern sufficient to support such a claim will
often exist, and the small number of cases seem to bear this out."5 The
difficulty of showing scienter and intention to mislead has been noted.
Similarly, misstatements will likely consist of opinion and not fact,
such as puffing in advertising. In cases of gross misrepresentation the
student's reliance upon the misrepresentations may not have been
justifiable. And as in a contract recovery it will be hard to show
damages-or at least enough damages to make litigation feasible.
For example, it would be hard to quantify the harm to one who went
of false promises. See also R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 298 (1969). citing as an example IOWA
CODE ANN. ch. 713 (West 1954).
" For the elements of misrepresentation see W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 105. See
generally id. §§ 105-10.
4 Not many cases discuss misrepresentation because the problem is usually resolved on
the contract issue. For example, in Southern Methodist Univ. v. Evans, 131 Tex. 333, 115
S.W.2d 622 (1938), the plaintiff alleged a fraudulently induced contract, but the court found
no contract existed in that case and thus resolved the issue. In other cases the student has won
on the contract issue and the misrepresentation issue, though raised, is never reached. E.g.,
Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1972). Cf. Stad v.
Grace Downs Model and Air Career School, 65 Misc. 2d 1095, 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1971).
" Count two of the complaint in Ojalvo v. Ohio State Univ., No. 76-0602 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
1976), is based on fraud, i.e. misrepresentation, but the bulk of the complaint sounds in
contract. The plaintiffs in Behrend v. Ohio, No. 75-0401 (Ohio Ct. Cl., filed June 27, 1975),
on the other hand, rely solely on misrepresentation. The first of these cases has been settled
and the second is at a very early stage.
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to Great-Plains University instead of Rocky Mountain College be-
cause of the former's claims about its scenic and recreational oppor-
tunities. Perhaps this militates in favor of use of the criminal law for
deterrence of such actions since the state need not show substantial
harm to anyone in order to convict.69 And possibly the stigma of a
criminal conviction would have a greater deterrent effect on schools
than the possibly less costly and surely less publicized civil suit.70
D. Statutory Duty Theory
When the perpetrator of the abuse charged is a state-supported
college or university the student possibly has a good claim based upon
breach of a statutory duty. This claim will obviously be dependent
upon the statutes of the state in question. At least one court has held
that breach of a statutory duty did constitute a valid claim in the
student-higher education context. 71 That case related to a duty to try
to place an education student as a secondary school student-teacher.
The holding was dependent on the wording of the statute in question,
but the statute only spoke in general terms and did not specifically
impose any duty. Nothing in the language of the case suggested other
similar statutes could not yield similar holdings. The key for the
student litigant is to find a statute that is on point with the student's
grievance. An example of a statute that explicitly prohibits certain
school abuses and even authorizes civil recovery by students is
California Education Code § 29035.72 This section outlaws false ad-
vertising by certain schools and provides for recovery of damages by
students, including court costs and reasonable attorney fees. Such
explicit statutes are not very common but provide undeniably valid
11 See State v. Jost, 127 Vt. 120, 241 A.2d 316 (1968), dealing with a conviction for false
advertising by a school claiming it could deliver "education and vacation." While remanding
the case for retrial on the issue of whether enough proof was put forward to prove the advertise-
ment's falsity, the court clearly said the school's agent could be held criminally liable.
70 The school itself could be held criminally liable in some states. See, e.g., OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.23 (Page 1975).
7' James v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 322 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. W.Va.), affd per
curiant, 448 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1971). In this case the plaintiff sought recovery based upon the
failure of the school to place him as a student-teacher. Since the student was a known radical
leader, the school could place him only in a distant school, though no farther from the school
than the other student-teachers had found it necessary to go. The student refused to go there
and claimed he should have been placed closer to the school. The court held that the statute
did impose a duty upon the school, but said "[tihe extent of [the school's] duty would appear
to be limited to making a good faith effort to place those of its students" in a school. 322 F.
Supp. at 226. The court held that the school had complied with that duty and found for the
defendant. The statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-6 (Michie 1975), was little more than an
authorization for public schools to establish a student-teacher program.
" CAL. EDUC. CODE § 29035 (West 1975).
COMMENT
claims where available, so such avenues should always be investi-
gated.73 The passage of statutes authorizing a private civil remedy
could be an effective legislative approach for attacking such abuses,
while avoiding having to go through possibly over-burdened prosecu-
tors' offices or a state consumer protection agency.
Unless one is dealing with a specific obligation on the part of
the school, it could be difficult to make out a winning claim based
upon breach of statutory duty. For example, Ohio Revised Code
§ 1713.0311 gives the state board of education the power to require
that higher education institutions meet certain standards in order to
procure a certificate of operation from the state. While one could
argue that violation of these standards constitutes an actionable
breach of statutory duty, it would likely be a futile argument. For
not only does the statute itself imply that withdrawal of the certifi-
cate by the state board would be the proper remedy, but Ohio Revised
Code § 1713.0671 gives the board the power (through the attorney
general) to enjoin a school from operating without the certificate. So
in this case, and possibly many others, an arguable general statutory
duty could be found to exist but with provision for governmental and
not private enforcement of the duty.76 One commentator has argued
that unless such statutes provide for a remedy by their own terms a
court should not provide one, that being solely in the province of the
legislature.77
E. Other Theories
Some suits may allege that a school has denied the student his
constitutional right to an education. This claim is a dubious one, at
best, for the right to an education is not found either explicitly or
implicitly in the United States Constitution.79 State constitutions
n The student could also try less explicit statutes such as OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 4165
(Page Supp. 1975). § 4165.02 labels misrepresentation of services, inter alia, as a "deceptive
trade practice", and § 4165.03 authorizes, in addition to any other remedies available, an
injunction against such practices and provides for a successful party to recover court costs and
attorneys' fees.
71 Omno REV. CODE ANN. § 1713.03 (Page 1975).
7' Id. § 1713.06.
s For another example of a statutory provision for governmental enforcement to correct
school abuses, see CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-59-114 (1974).
" Suing the Schools for Fraud: Issues and Legal Strategies, supra note 53, at 75.
7 No case has been found alleging this for post-secondary schools, but it is often discussed
in the analogous area of secondary schools. See note 53 supra.
1, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court held
that, for equal protection purposes, strict scrutiny should not be used to analyze a legislative
classification for education because education was not a right found explicitly or implicitly in
the United States Constitution.
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sometimes have some general language about this right,"0 but usually
apply only to primary and secondary education and not higher educa-
tion, and are too vague to provide a basis for recovery.
A litigant might want to argue for a type of strict liability for
schools, akin to the strict liability that has developed for man-
ufacturers of products."' But the theoretical bases for imposing
strict liability upon manufacturers are inapposite in this consumer
context.82 Imposition of strict liability is a policy decision made to
deter the production of unusually dangerous products, and even the
worst educational abuse is hardly dangerous to human safety. The
policy is also designed to protect innocent parties, but that is no more
true here than in any situation since all civil litigation is designed to
shift the loss from innocent parties. Strict liability is also imposed
when negligence would probably be the underlying claim but would
be too hard to prove to enable one to recover. But in the education
context, negligence, or breach of contract, should not be extraordi-
narily hard to show in the cases when it does exist. Furthermore strict
liability was designed to protect persons not in privity of contract
with the manufacturer, while it has been shown that students are
considered to be in a contractual relationship with their school.
It should be noted at this point that all of the above claims are
not mutually exclusive. A given fact pattern could properly give rise
to any number of claims and the student-plaintiff would be wise to
plead in the alternative, as many have done.83 For example, if the
school made a misrepresentation it probably committed a breach of
contract. Or a breach of contract or of a statutory duty may have
been due to negligence. While application in the education setting of
some of these claims may be somewhat novel, one or more claims
should be successful if the factual allegations supporting them can be
adequately shown.84
1 The Ohio Constitution speaks of education only as one of the things for which the
legislature may expend funds and calls for a state board of education. OHIO CONST. art. VI, .§
1-4.
' See W. PROSSER, supra note 57, §§ 96-104.
52 For the bases hereinafter elaborated upon, see id. See also RESTATEMENT SECOND OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
12 E.g., in Zumbrun v. University of So. Calif., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1972), the plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, constructive fraud, breach of
warranty, misrepresentation, negligence, breach of trust, and conspiracy. In Ojalvo v. Ohio
State Univ., No. 75-0602 (Ohio Ct. Cf. 1976), the complaint alleges breach of contract, fraud,
and unjust enrichment.
I" Students Filing Consumer Suits, supra note 18, reports that, at present at least, only
the worst cases of abuse will yield recovery but that potential liability will grow in the future
as this type of litigation expands from proprietary schools to traditional higher education. This
analysis is almost certainly correct.
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III. DEFENSES
It has been demonstrated that no doctrinal considerations stand
in the way of student recovery for certain educational abuses, and the
few precedents uphold this, but that is not to say that student recovery
is or should be assured. A number of traditional defenses are avail-
able to counter some of the above legal theories, and in many cases
the defendant's arguments would appear to be conclusive.
In the contract area there is the general notion that a plaintiff
may not recover for damages that he could have prevented. 5 It would
seem that in many cases a student could have prevented much of the
harm inflicted upon him with some action in the early stages. For
example, since he saw a course did not offer what he wanted he could
have dropped it. Or once he knew a professor was off track, he could
have gone to the Dean or Department Chairman. These actions
would not necessarily eliminate all damages, but certainly they could
reduce them.
A defense similar to the one just mentioned is the tort doctrine
of contributory negligence. 6 It is certain that many consumer-type
student injuries will have been caused, at least in part, by the fault of
the student; thus he may not recover. In addition to the above exam-
ples, failure to inquire about academic requirements, failure to inves-
tigate a school's claims of quality, or refusal to do extra work to
make up for deficient teaching could all be deemed contributory
negligence. Education is a "two-way street," and for a student to fail
to learn there almost has to be fault on his part as well as on the part
of the professor or administrator. 7 Whether the student aggravated
his damages or was contributorily negligent are questions to be deter-
mined case by case, but clearly these defenses will be among those
available to a school to bar student recovery. 8
Another tort doctrine that could bar recovery is assumption of
risk.89 The doctrine denies recovery to one who voluntarily exposed
himself to a known risk and then was injured, even if by the negli-
I See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 30, § 1039. For an analogous rule see UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 2-715(B) (2). The doctrine also applies in tort law. E.g., Ellerman Lines v. The
President Harding, 288 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961). Usually contributory negligence will be a bar
to recovery when the plaintiff has contributed to his harm. See notes 86-88 infra and accompa-
nying text.
" See W. PROSSER, supra note 57, §§ 65, 67. Whether this completely bars recovery
(traditional contributory negligence) or merely proportionately reduces it (comparative negli-
gence) depends on the jurisdiction and is beyond the scope of this Comment.
" See Students Filing Consumer Suits, supra note 18.
" S. SANDOW, supra note 53, at 20, lists contributory negligence as one of the expected
defenses to cases in the consumer-education context.
" See W. PROssER, supra note 57, § 68.
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gence of another. A school could argue that, even if it was negligent,
the student should be denied recovery since he knew that, say, getting
poor professors or having a poor educational experience was one of
the risks of a college education. This should be a good defense to
some of the claims based upon failure to live up to a certain standard
of quality, for surely it is one of the understood risks of college that
some professors encountered will be lacking. Similarly, in the con-
tract area, the school could argue that these risks are an implied term
of the contract. It is customary to expect that some aspects of one's
college experience will not be ideal, so a student should not be granted
money damages because that turns out to be the case. But these
defenses will not hold up against charges of misrepresentation, for it
would be inappropriate to say that a student should expect to be lied
to by school authorities. And if the student complains that an explicit
written term of the student-school contract was broken, it would be
inappropriate to suggest that he should reasonably have expected the
breach. Since the student simply should not be required to anticipate
these abuses, he has not voluntarily exposed himself to any risk.
Another possible defense would be that the student had a num-
ber of prior remedies available and should not now be allowed to seek
redress in the courts. This would be similar to the notion often ad-
vanced that one must exhaust his administrative remedies before
judicial remedies are available."0 Administrative remedies available in
this context might include a student government grievance procedure,
intercession of a university ombudsman, or routing of complaints to
a department chairman or school dean. This defense would probably
be available only if the school actually had some established griev-
ance procedure and had insisted that students use it as a first step
toward any satisfaction of claims. Or the school could go beyond
making it a condition precedent and insist that such a procedure be
an exclusive remedy, akin to a contract provision requiring arbitra-
tion.
A defense that could defeat any claim by a student against a
state supported university is the doctrine of sovereign immunity."
0 See, e.g., McLucas v. De Champlin, 421 U.S. 21 (1975); Renegotiation Board v. Ban-
nercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). Often a
statute must provide for a remedy outside the courts for this to be available. This argument
was at least one factor in deciding in favor of a school-defendant in Mahavongsanan v. Hall,
529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). The court noted, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, that
"[i]nstead of pursuing her grievance through the administrative remedies provided in the By-
laws of the Board of Regents of the University, she brought suit." Id. at 450. This was especially
important in finding no denial of due process. This defense was dispositive in Schwartz v. Bank
Street College of Education, 381 N.Y.S.2d 282 (App. Div. 1976).
", See W. PROSSER, supra, note 57, § 131. Sovereign immunity could also bar many claims
against a state school, not just tort claims.
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This bar is applied less and less by modern courts" but will still deny
recovery in some jurisdictions when the school is considered a branch
of the state government. The full scope of sovereign immunity is
beyond the scope of this Comment, but it must be noted as a possible
trap for the unwary litigant. A similar impediment could be the im-
munity granted in some circumstances to public officials acting in
their official capacities.93 This immunity does not insulate public
officials altogether," however, and should not be seen as a total bar
to recovery. These immunities are noted as potential hurdles that the
litigant will have to cross.
Finally, it should be remembered that a school always has the
factual "defense" that the student has failed to adequately make out
the required elements of his claim, or that the charges are simply
false. The student may just fail to show that the school breached its
contract, or that it was negligent, or that it made a misrepresentation.
Such arguments, touched upon earlier in the discussion of the various
claims, would probably be the school's first line of attack upon a
student's suit.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In examining any possible litigation in the area of consumer
protection and higher education a number of overriding concerns
should be discussed. Foremost is the basic question of whether the
courts are the proper forum for the resolution of these disputes. Many
of the problems in this area arguably could be better solved by legisla-
tive action, with full opportunities for all sides to be heard and all
consequences discussed. The context of private litigation often does
not provide a forum for all interested parties to be heard. Such a
forum could be essential in an area of developing law, which lacks
the benefit of precedents to guide legal decisions and to aid in predict-
ing the consequences of a given court holding. Nevertheless, it has
been shown that many traditional legal doctrines could easily be
applied to this area and, on the basis of current trends, it appears that
courts probably will not hesitate to take such cases. The notion that
92 Even if sovereign immunity does apply generally in the state, some courts have held that
procurement of insurance by a state agency waives the immunity, at least to the extent of the
insurance coverage. See, e.g., Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.2d
700 (1942); Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 266, 226 Or. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961). See also OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. ch. 2743 (Page 1975), which waives Ohio's sovereign immunity.
9 See W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 132.
" E.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975), grant state executive officers and local school board officials, respectively, only qualified
immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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institutions dedicated to helping others should not be amenable to
lawsuits, which once held sway in the form of the doctrine of charita-
ble immunity, is almost a dead letter today.95 One recent case has
brought home the idea that institutions of higher education are in
many senses big business and not merely ivory towers set apart from
reality." So the courts are likely to be the forum to resolve these
problems, absent legislative or other action to prevent growth of the
problem, and the law must be ready to deal with the cases that will
surely be presented.
One possible way of lessening the problem of the lack of presen-
tation of all points of view in such litigation would be to include more
parties through the vehicle of a class action. Students could band
together in a class action against a school if the school had acted
similarly toward a large group of students and the other prerequisites
for a class action were met.17 This situation could arise in either a
contract or misrepresentation action based on a false written state-
ment, since all students would have an identical claim if all were
affected in the same manner. In other cases the group may not be
large enough to be eligible for a class action but could still overcome
some of the high costs of litigation by the joinder of plaintiffs. 8
Joining a large number of students could also lessen the problem of
small damage recoveries, avoiding the bar of de minimis non curat
lex and making litigation financially feasible.9" It seems probable,
however, that in many circumstances a school will not have acted
'7 See W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 133.
'7 Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Second-
ary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 965 (1970). In holding that education was trade or commerce for purposes of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the district court said: "Higher education in America today possesses
many of the attributes of business. To hold otherwise would ignore the obvious and challenge
reality." 302 F. Supp. at 466. The court of appeals reversed, saying that the defendant's
objectives were not commercial, but did not explicitly disapprove the above statement.
17 FEE. R. Civ. P. 23(a) states
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impractical, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest
of the class.
OHIo R. Civ. P. 23(A) is identical.
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 20 allows permissive joinder of plaintiffs or defendants if there is a claim
or defense arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and if there are common questions
of law or fact. OHIo R. Civ. P. 20 is, with minor exceptions, identical.
11 Students Filing Consumer Suits, supra note 18, lists the expense of lawsuits and their
concomitant out-of-court settlement as reasons for the lack of success of most of these con-
sumer suits. Similarly, the fact that students are frequently acting as their own lawyers is cited
as a reason for failure.
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similarly toward a large number of identifiable students and, more
likely, students will not have reacted similarly to the school's action.
So in most cases the class action or even joinder of plaintiffs will
probably not be available, and most individuals would not be so upset
as to go to the trouble of maintaining such a complex piece of litiga-
tion on their own.
A court dealing with novel types of litigation such as those sug-
gested in this Comment could turn to public policy arguments in
making its decision, since there is not a wealth of case law on point.
This could militate in favor of either the student-plaintiff or the
school-defendant, but should on balance be more beneficial to the
former. Policy arguments in favor of schools would include a desire
to encourage educational experimentation, claiming that allowing
recovery for an experiment that did not work out would deter such
experimentation. And in these times of financial hardship for most
institutions of higher education, it could cause serious trouble to large
numbers of persons if precious dollar resources were diverted out of
the hands of the schools and into the pockets of students claiming
injury. Finally, schools have argued that courts should not substitute
their judgment for those of professional educators- who are trained to
evaluate the success or failure of higher education.100
Policy factors working in favor of students would include the
deterrent effect of civil litigation upon future misconduct on the part
of schools.'0' The most important policy matter working in favor of
students is simply that those who have been harmed should be com-
pensated for such harm by those who caused it. This is the philosophi-
cal underpinning of our entire system of civil litigation and no reasons
have been found to totally insulate higher education from this system.
"I One recent case which found this argument persuasive was Mahavongsanan v. Hall,
529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). The court held that federal courts should not subject academic
dismissals to nearly the same scrutiny as disciplinary dismissals. It apparently adopted the
school's argument that the lower court's injunction constituted "an unwarranted, as well as
unprecedented, judicial intrusion into matters of traditional educational decision making which
are beyond the scope of judicial review." Id. at 449. The court also relied on Wright v. Texas
So. Univ., 392 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968): "We know of no case which holds that colleges
and universities are subject to the supervision or review of the courts in the uniform application
of their academic standards." See also Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975), which
held that a student must show bad faith or arbitrariness to challenge an academic dismissal;
Nustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968); Militana v.
University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162 (Fla. App. 1970); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55
S.W.2d 805 (1932). However, courts generally are not hesitant to demand of other professions
(e.g., doctors and accountants) that certain standards be met, despite the courts' lack of exper-
tise in the area. For a classic example of such judicial audacity, see The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d
737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Learned Hand, J.).
" The deterrent effect of criminal law sanctions is also to be remembered. See notes 72
and 73 supra and accompanying text.
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This is not to say that all courts should welcome students with open
arms and prepare to readily invade the coffers of higher education.
Rather it is to say that, in at least some instances, students have been
seriously harmed by certain parties and should not be denied a chance
to be compensated merely because those parties happen to be institu-
tions of higher education or because the cause of action is a bit
unusual in nature.
The abuses that have been listed present more than just a prob-
lem to the aggrieved student, for they are harmful to society in a
larger sense. They constitute a waste of human resources and a misal-
location of social resources by artificially distorting the free market.
Many of the losses are suffered by persons who can least afford to
waste their time and money. And surely governmental resources are
wasted when public funds are expended to financially support the
school, the student, or both. The potential seriousness of these abuses
indicates a need for preventive medicine rather than treatment after
the fact through expensive litigation.
V. AVOIDING THE PROBLEM
This Comment has pointed out that a large number of abuses
presently occur in school-student dealings, 02 making the topic of
consumer protection and higher education an important one. Fur-
thermore the likely success of at least some suits against schools has
been predicted." 3 Thus the prudent course of action by all parties
concerned would be an effort to avoid such lawsuits. The schools are
the parties that will most assuredly be adversely affected by successful
litigation, so action on their part would be an appropriate first step. 4
The simple remedy is to cease whatever perceived abuses there
are-to examine the school's policies to see if any of the aforemen-
tioned problems exist and to take positive action to stop them. More
specifically, the school should examine just what it is promising stu-
dents in catalogues, bulletins, and other written and oral respresenta-
tions to see if these representations, which could be deemed part of
the student-school contract, mesh with reality. Similarly, the school
should examine what its agents are telling both prospective and cur-
rent students to see if they are making statements that might come
back to haunt the school in the form of a misrepresentation charge.
102 See section I supra.
t See sections II-IV supra, especially note 83 supra.
104 This assumes the school is conscientious both in trying to avoid lawsuits and to avoid
harming their students. If a school is intentionally perpetrating the abuses, then suggested
voluntary action on their part would probably fall on deaf ears.
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Preventing negligence would be harder to do and could never be
totally successful-the only suggestion would be for superiors to keep
a close eye on the work of subordinates to try to make sure they are
meeting reasonable standards. Breach of statutory duty claims could
be avoided by a check of all statutorily imposed programs against the
terms of the relevant statute. Essentially, what a school wishing to
avoid litigation can do is to make sure that it is meeting all duties
that it imposes upon itself (by contract or representations) or that are
imposed by law (by statute and negligence law). Any change could
be in one of two forms. The school could change what is expected of
it by changing catalogue provisions and the like,"05 or even by lobby-
ing for changes in statutory obligations. On the other hand, the
school could change what it is doing to conform with what has been
expected of it. The latter would be a more satisfactory solution, but
the former is more easily and quickly done and will be adopted by
pragmatic schools or those with resource constraints upon program
offerings.
A school could also insist upon a disclaimer of liability from all
students. The disclaimer could be a condition of enrollment and
should be in writing and signed by the student, or otherwise conspicu-
ously brought to his attention. This could be enforced as a part of
the student-school contract,08 although it would border on uncon-
scionability. The contract is already excessively one-sided and this
might be the next step needed to label it as a contract of adhesion.0 7
The disclaimer could also run into difficulties in negligence actions
since it is often hard to disclaim liability for negligence." 8 A school
could also establish a grievance procedure of the sort discussed ear-
lier, if for no other reason than to be able to claim in court that a
student who failed to exhaust this administrative remedy should be
denied access to the courts. A fair grievance procedure, such as an
ombudsman program, could probably go a long way in heading off
suits in the first place, making it a good investment for the school.,0 9
11 See, e.g., University of Akron Bulletin, School of Law Edition 1 (1975): "The Univer-
sity of Akron reserves the right to change without notice any of the information, requirements,
regulations, or fee structure, published in this Bulletin. The Bulletin is not to be regarded as a
contract." For a similar disclaimer see Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442, 443
(Fla. App.), cert. denied, 104 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1958).
I" See section II.A. supra.
107 Id.
'" W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 68. Prosser says ordinarily one can disclaim in advance
holding another liable for negligence, but not if one party is at an obvious bargaining advantage
and forces the disclaimer upon another. This, of course, resembles the contract of adhesion
analysis. See Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 100
So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1958), in which a catalogue reservation of the right to expel a student appar-
ently was helpful in finding an expulsion actionable.
I"1 See note 90 supra and accompanying text. A fair grievance procedure could also defeat
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The above actions focus upon what a school can do at least to
cover itself, if not to solve the underlying problems. But many schools
will be unable or unwilling to invoke such changes for a variety of
reasons, so other action could be necessary if the problems persist."0
One possibility is external regulation. The entity that first comes to
mind when regulation is mentioned is the federal government. It
could play a significant regulatory role because of the huge amount
of leverage it has over most institutions of higher education in the
form of grants, subsidies, loan guarantees, and other financial consid-
erations. Such funding could be made conditional upon compliance
with a set of regulations, established by a federal or private agency
designed to prevent as many of the abuses as possible that hurt the
student as a consumer. Once again, though, one runs into the problem
that some of the abuses are easily measured and thus could be easily
reformed or at least monitored, while other abuses are less quantifia-
ble and too amorphous to be readily controlled. So any such regula-
tions would be able to attack a limited number of the abuses that are
common today. State governments also have leverage over schools
in the state, especially public schools, in the form of funding and the
power to license."' State government regulation would have the ad-
vantage of being better able to recognize the needs of local students
and schools, though this might also result in more bowing to political
pressures, which schools could more likely muster than students.
Another- group with significant leverage over institutions of
higher education is the private accrediting associations. They could
play an important role in preventing consumer abuses by condition-
ing accreditation upon compliance with standards designed to cut
down on such abuses, much as they now condition accreditation upon
compliance with certain academic and other standards. Such groups,
largely composed of professional educators, might be better suited to
deal with some of the less measurable abuses by examining the con-
tent or quality of academic offerings. The problem with reliance on
a claim that a state-supported school denied a student due process. See Mahavongsanan v. Hall,
529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). Although the court held that due process requirements do not
apply to academic dismissals, it also stated that the school's providing a grievance procedure,
which plaintiff did not take advantage of, meant she had not been denied due process in any
event. Id at 450.
110 Successful civil litigation could provide enough deterrence to lessen the problem. While
students will and should be successful in some cases, it will be difficult for a large number of
student suits, to be successful due to adverse court reactions and good defenses in many cases.
Also, many students may not be financially able to bring suits due to the high costs of litigation.
Small recoveries may rule out the use of contingent fees for attorneys. Finally, most students
are surely unaware of this possible route to recovery.
I See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 1713 (Page Supp. 1975).
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accrediting associations is that this is essentially what they are sup-
posed to do now and complaints still arise.' 2 And since accrediting
associations have been accused by some of being "clubbish" and self-
serving, perhaps an examination by them would only be superficial.
Some have argued that the solution to this problem is not to be
found in any one approach but rather must come from a "tripartite"
attack."' This approach emphasizes that the federal government,
state governments, and private accrediting associations all have a role
to play in the process of outside regulation of consumer abuses in
higher education. Certainly this is the route that will have to be taken,
in conjunction with self-regulation by the schools, for no single re-
form is going to eliminate the problem. "Consumer protection and
higher education" is a very broad, catchall phrase that spans many
types of abuses, so it would be naive to think that any one change
will make all aspects of this complex problem disappear. The deterr-
ence of civil litigation will help, as will criminal sanctions, but neither
will be feasible in all cases. Governmental or private regulation, as
well as self-regulation, will help cut down on abuses, but cannot
eliminate all of them. It will only be a combination of some or all of
these remedial steps that will be able to effect a significant reduction
in these problems.
J. Douglas Drushal
112 A school might want to argue that being accredited is a stamp of approval on its
academic programs, thus precluding any suits based on the shortcomings of these programs.
"I This term was coined by Joseph Clark, Commissioner of the Indiana Private School
Accrediting Commission, in testimony before the Congress, according to a letter to the author
from Mr. Clark. For a discussion of the various roles of state and federal governments and
private accrediting agencies, see Davidson and Stark, The Federal Role, Callan and Jonsen,
The State Role, and EI-Khawas, Clarifying Roles and Purposes, in PROMOTING CONSUMER
PROTECTION FOR STUDENTS (J. Stark ed. 1976).
